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A move to majoritarian nationalism? Challenges of representation in South Asia.  
 
Despite India’s status as the world’s largest democracy and increasing 
turnouts in many of the countries of South Asia, recent elections raise 
concerns about the threat to democracy in the form of majoritarianism. Many 
of the countries of South Asia are extremely diverse and (mainly) informal 
mechanisms of accommodation of minorities have been deployed. At the same 
time concerns about the threat to minority rights in India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka have been strongly articulated.   It is notable that those countries of 
South Asia, such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which have not accommodated 
their non-dominant groups, have witnessed high levels of conflict.  India has 
been more accommodative, of both linguistic and religious minorities.  
However, it is precisely this process of accommodation that many in India 
now worry will be undermined by Hindu majoritarianism.   
 
A move to majoritarian nationalism? Challenges of representation in South 
Asia.1  
 
2014 witnessed the biggest election the world has ever seen.  India, democratic since 
independence in 1947,2 held elections between April-May for its 16th Lok Sabha, 
House of the People.  In the previous twelve months three other South Asian countries 
held elections; Pakistan in May 2013, Nepal in November 2013 (to its Constituent 
Assembly) and Bangladesh in January 2014. However, although elections have been 
held, and turnout has increased in both India and Pakistan, Dibyesh Anand (2014) has 
argued that there is a threat to democracy in the form of ‘majoritarianism’. This builds 
on the work of Ayesha Jalal (1995) who has previously argued that the ostensible 
democratic differences between the states of South Asia conceal a latent 
authoritarianism. Anand argues that ‘democracy is not a number game; it is more than 
a political system that allows for regular elections to choose those who govern … it is 
very much about minority rights and about individual rights – such as the right to 
dissent without fear’ (2014).  Concerns he, and many other prominent academics and 
political commentators, such as Zoya Hasan (2014) and Ramachandra Guha (2014) 
articulate about India and Pakistan are seen even more strikingly in Sri Lanka.  This 
majoritarianism expresses itself in many ways; what is striking is the limited extent of 
minority representation in both the executive and legislature since the recent 
elections. 
 
In societies as diverse as those in South Asia, as Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate, concerns 
about majoritarianism, the demonization of certain groups within the political 
discourse of the state and the lack of access to effective power raises real concerns 
about the quality of democracy.  Elections are an important aspect of democracy but, 
as Arend Lijphart (1977) has reminded us, majoritarian structures undermine the 
effective representation of groups and can lead to conflict. 
  
Table 1. The effective number of religious groups – ENRG - in South Asia 
 
 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Muslim 89.5 Hindu 80.5 Hindu 81.3 Muslim 96.3 Buddhist 76.7 
Hindu 9.6 Muslim 13.4 Buddhist 9 Hindu 1.6 Muslim 8.5 
  Christian 2.3 Islam 4.4 Christian 1.6 Hindu 7.8 
  Sikh 1.9 Kirat 3.1 Sch Caste 0.3 Catholic 6.1 
  Buddhist 0.8 Christian 1.4 Ahmadi 0.2 Other Chr 0.9 
  Jain 0.4 Pakriti 0.5     
ENRG 1.2 ENRG 1.5 ENRG 1.5 ENRG 1.1 ENRG 1.7 
 
 
As Table 1 demonstrates, all the states under discussion in this paper have a dominant 
religious group; dominant both numerically and politically.  Pakistan is the most 
homogenous, although these data on religion conceal the Sunni-Shia divide, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thanks to Filippo Boni and Oana Burcu for providing research assistance for this article, Carole 
Spary and Andrew Wyatt for commenting on an earlier draft, and Lori Thorlakson and Louise Tillin 
for discussing specific issues with me.  All errors are of course my own. 
2 With a short interregnum 1975-77 for its ‘Emergency’ 
has polarised Pakistan since the 1970s.  All the other states have a sizeable religious 
minority or minorities.  Many of the populations of South Asian countries (especially 
India) are large. Therefore, Sikhs, with less than two percent of the Indian population 
comprise almost 20 million people.   Some of these religious minorities are 
concentrated, others are more dispersed.  This has implications for effective 
representation.  Federal solutions may recommend themselves to territorially 
concentrated minorities such as Sikhs in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka or Seraiki 
speakers in Pakistan3 but they are less applicable to territorially dispersed groups, 
such as Muslims in India (with the exception of Kashmir).   
 
Table 2. The effective number of linguistic groups – ENLG - in South Asia 
 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Bengali  98 Hindi  41.0 Nepali 44.6 Punjabi 44.1 Sinhala 74 
Others 2 Bengali  8.1 Maithili 11.7 Pushto 15.4 Tamil 18 
  Telugu  7.2 Bhojpuri 6 Sindhi 14.1   
  Marathi  7 Tharu 5.8 Seraiki 10.5   
  Tamil  5.9 Tamang 5.1 Urdu 7.6   
  Urdu  5.0 Newar 3.2 Balochi 3.6   
  Gujarati  4.5 Bajjika 3     
  Kannada  3.7 Magar 3     
  Malayalam  3.2 Doteli 3     
  Oriya  3.2 Urdu 2.6     
  Punjabi  2.8       
  Assamese  1.3       
ENLG 1.04 ENLG 5.07 ENLG 4.41 ENLG 3.90 ENLG 1.72 
 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, South Asia is even more linguistically heterogeneous, with 
the exception of Bangladesh.  India, Pakistan and Nepal have very sizeable and 
numerous minorities.  Sri Lanka appears relatively homogeneous but the size of the 
minority community (and its territorial concentration) have ensured that the 
(ethno)linguistic divide is significant.  Ethno nationalism along linguistic lines 
(sometimes crosscutting with religious identities) has posed challenges for India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Most of these states adopted majoritarian 
constitutions, although some, such as India, possess informal consociational features 
(Adeney 2007).  In India, the nationwide Indian National Congress (INC) informally 
represented the different regions of India.  This contrasted to both Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, where there was no nationwide political party straddling (and thus 
accommodating) the diversity (Adeney and Wyatt 2004). 
 
In today’s India however, as well as the other countries of South Asia, many of the 
political parties are weak, personalistic and undermined by dynastic politics (Mufti 
and Waseem 2012, Wilkinson 2007, Wyatt 2009).   Political parties are important 
elements in a democratic system, training potential future leaders, assisting the 
representation of people and aggregating their interests (Randall and Svåsand 2002). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Seraiki speakers are concentrated in the south of the Punjab and there are longstanding demands for 
the creation of a Seraiki speaking state and to divide the Punjab. 
Weak and personalistic political parties therefore potentially weaken the quality of a 
democracy.  
 
In ethnically divided societies, it is important that the different groups have a stake in 
the political system.  This can occur through different processes.  The effective 
representation of a group and its interests does not solely depend on securing 
representation in a legislature or executive.  It is of course, possible that, in a Burkean 
sense, groups may be represented by members of groups other than their own.  Such 
an approach is promoted by integrationists such as Donald Horowitz (1985) who 
argue for electoral systems that favour moderates seeking to bridge ethnic divides.  
Others, in the consociationalist camp (O'Leary 2005), have argued that in ethnically 
divided societies it is vital to empower group leaders and that group interests (and 
stability) are best promoted through the inclusion of these leaders.  However, it is also 
possible that groups can be represented through informal mechanisms, such as 
representation in a political party or alliance that secures support from different 
groups.  This has been the most common form of accommodation in the executive in 
South Asia, particularly in India. 
 
Although representation in the executive will not necessarily result in better policy 
outcomes for a particular group (which is beyond the scope of this article to analyse), 
and descriptive representation (the representation of a group by members of that 
group) may not lead to substantive representation in terms of policy outcomes (Pitkin 
1972), in ethnically divided societies, such as in South Asia, when relations between 
groups are conflicted and there is a contested history, exclusion from central 
coalitions has been problematic.  
 
This article analyses three states, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, which have held 
national elections since 2010. To what extent is majoritarianism taking hold in these 
three countries? This article analyses whether different groups and regions are 
represented in the governing coalitions of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and analyses 
the regional distribution of support for governing coalitions in India and Pakistan. It 
finishes with an assessment of the possible policy implications of this representation 
(or lack of it).  
 
India 
 
India held its first elections under universal suffrage in the winter of 1951-2, ushering 
in a period of one party dominance.  The Indian National Congress reaped not only 
the benefit of being a genuinely national political party, with local roots (partly as a 
result of reorganising its party structures along linguistic lines in 1921), but also the 
fact that it secured a Condorcet majority as a result of the simple plurality electoral 
system.  Congress accommodated many different groups through the ‘Congress 
System’ (Kothari 1964), although authors such as Steven Wilkinson have rightly 
questioned the extent to which the accommodation was essentially tokenist for 
religious minorities (2000). However, Congress dominance waned in the late 1960s as 
regional parties came to power in several of India’s states.  As James Manor (1982) 
has analysed, Indira Gandhi’s split with the organisational wing of the Congress in the 
late 1960s led to a populist style of campaigning, seeking a direct link with the 
electorate.  This atrophied the Congress organisation, a situation from which it has 
never recovered (the party remains in thrall to the Gandhi family today – at the 
expense of much needed organisational renewal). Indira Gandhi’s centralisation and 
personalisation of Indian politics alienated many groups, and by the late 1980s 
Congress’s presence at the national level was diminished.  
 
Despite the personalisation of politics, the realities of alliance politics (coupled with 
the changes introduced by economic liberalisation in the early 1990s (Jenkins 1999)) 
led to a revival of the power of the states of the Indian federation.  One of the new 
developments within the new political architecture was the rise of Hindu nationalism 
as an electoral force, with a short lived coalition formed at the centre in 1996, and a 
BJP led national coalition government in 1998 and again in 1999.   The BJP was 
quick to adapt to the new realities of coalition politics, realising that its message of 
Hindutva would not appeal to a pan-Indian base (Hinduism is a diverse religion, and 
much of this diversity manifests itself along regional lines).  The BJP embraced 
federalism and, to some extent, the regional diversity of India (Adeney 2005, Tillin 
2013).  The electoral success of the BJP did however raise concerns over the fate of 
religious minorities within India, enhanced by the Gujarat pogrom of 2002 which led 
to the death of between 1000-2000 Muslims (a state of which Modi was Chief 
Minister at the time) (Human Rights Watch 2002).  
 
Since 1989 it had been the new ‘certainty’ of Indian politics that single party 
government was impossible; governments now being formed through pre or post 
election coalitions of national, regional and caste based political parties.  Many of 
these parties are personalistic machines, and dynastic politics is alive and well. 
Patrick French has calculated that two thirds of MPs under the age of 40 in the 
previous parliament had a near relative in politics (this increased to nine out of ten of 
sitting Congress MPs) (2014) and for the current Lok Sabha, Kanchan Chandra notes 
that 22 percent of MPs had ‘family precede them in politics’ (Nerukar 2014) and that 
66 percent of political parties have leaders with dynastic connections.  
 
Narendra Modi’s triumphant ascension to power in May 2014 as head of a BJP 
government (the Congress led UPA had ruled between 2004-2014) revitalised 
concerns of ethnic majoritarianism.  Despite (or perhaps because of) being a divisive 
figure, Modi managed to secure the BJP a majority of seats in the lower house, the 
Lok Sabha.  This was unexpected, the first time since 1984 that a single party had 
managed this.  The BJP benefitted from Modi’s ‘strong man’ image and impressions 
of weak, corrupt and ineffectual governance under the previous prime minister, 
Manmohan Singh.   
 
The aspirations of the youth (approximately half of India’s population are under 26 
and young voters comprised the overwhelming majority of the 100 million extra 
voters added to the electoral roll in 2014) were important in this election, and 
although projections of the ‘economic miracle’ of Gujarat were overplayed (other 
states have actually done better economically, and by other indicators, such as the 
HDI, Gujarat performs badly) (Ghatak and Roy 2014), Modi’s promises to make 
India an economic powerhouse resonated. Congress had empowered many of the 
poor, but many of those who benefited from Congress policies saw the BJP as better 
poised to deliver their aspirations (Barry 2014). Modi worked hard to cultivate a cult 
of personality, at the expense of the BJP (Sinha 2014). However, Modi also relied on 
the RSS (National Volunteer Association), a rightwing Hindu nationalist cadre based 
organisation, to ‘get out’ the vote, and there were many instances of anti-religious 
minority rhetoric in the campaign in the Hindi speaking heartland (Daniel and Kumar 
2014).  This prompted the Election Commission to call for ‘preventative measures’ to 
be taken against two BJP leaders for ‘creating disharmony between different religious 
communities’ (Reddy 2014). 
 
Although the overall majority Modi secured was extraordinary, it is important to 
stress that the BJP was a beneficiary of the simple plurality electoral system. It 
secured 31 percent of the vote and converted this to 282 (52%) seats, compared to 
Congress’s 19.3 percent converting to just 44 (8%) seats. Table 3 demonstrates the 
cumulative regional inequality score (Rose and Urwin 1975). This calculates the 
degree to which party support is homogeneous across the units (in India, the States 
and Union Territories of the federation).  A score of 1 indicates perfect territorial 
concentration; a score of 0 indicates perfect territorial dispersion.   
 
The CRI has been calculated using individual state data; although in Table 3, a 
regional breakdown is presented, for ease of tabulation.  These data change very 
slightly when the States and Union Territories that return only 1 or 2 members to the 
Lok Sabha are excluded from the calculations, but not for the vast majority of parties 
or alliances (and not for the INC, BJP, BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
or Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA).  Although the CRI can produce 
counter-intuitive results when a large amount of the population is concentrated in one 
state (such as the Punjab in Pakistan with 56 percent of the population), although 
Uttar Pradesh has 16.5 percent of India’s population, this does not skew the scores. 
 
Those parties with a regional base such as the TDP in Andhra Pradesh, and the 
ADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu are very territorially concentrated, all with scores 
between 0.91-0.93.  In contrast, the NDA is relatively evenly distributed with a CRI 
score of 0.15.  It is more regionally distributed than the UPA.  The BJP on its own 
scores 0.24, reflecting its reliance on its alliance partners for territorial spread, but a 
score of 0.24 is still more nationally distributed than that of the Congress in the 2014 
election, with 0.28.  These data demonstrate that the BJP’s reach is more ‘national’ 
than often supposed. 
 
Table 3. Index of Cumulative Regional Inequality for Indian Election 2014 by 
Alliance and by Party (calculated from vote shares) 
 
Alliance CRI Vote 
share 
NE N S NW E W Isl Total 
NDA 0.15 42.95 3.50 46.09 18.82 3.72 8.77 19.05 0.04 100 
UPA 0.26 27.33 4.93 38.72 20.60 5.04 11.38 19.23 0.09 100 
           
Party CRI Vote 
share 
NE N S NW E W Isl Total 
BJP 0.24 31.00 3.59 53.60 12.54 2.45 10.80 16.97 0.05 100 
Congress 0.28 19.31 6.12 35.29 24.11 6.33 11.47 16.58 0.10 100 
           
Party CRI Vote 
share 
        
AAP 0.54 2.05         
BSP 0.55 4.14         
NCP 0.79 1.56         
CPM 0.81 3.25         
SP 0.82 3.37         
AITC 0.87 3.84         
SHS 0.89 1.85         
TDP 0.91 2.55         
ADMK 0.93 3.27         
DMK 0.93 1.74         
SAD 0.97 0.66         
 
Notes: 
Data calculated from Election Commission of India website www.eci.gov.in  
It is difficult to accurately define NDA members, even BJP leaders differ. I have included the parties 
listed in Mohan (2014). 
Regions:  
NE = Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura 
N = Bihar, Delhi, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand 
S = Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Puducherry, Tamil Nadu. 
NW = Chandigarh, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh 
E = Odisha, West Bengal, Jharkhand, 
W = Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Goa, Gujarat, Maharashtra 
Islands = Laksahadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands 
 
Table 4. Number and percentage of seats for Party/Alliance by region of India 
 
 NE N S NW E W Islands Total 
Seats 
BJP 8 3% 174 62% 21 7% 10 4% 15 5% 53 19% 1 0% 282 
INC 8 18% 8 18% 19 43% 3 7% 4 9% 2 6% 0 0% 44 
                
NDA 10 3% 185 55% 39 12% 14 4% 15 4% 72 21% 1 0% 336 
UPA 8 13% 15 25% 22 36% 3 5% 6 10% 6 10% 2 1% 61 
Others 7 5% 7 5% 69 47% 7 5% 56 38% 0 0% 0 0% 146 
 
Notes 
Data calculated from Election Commission of India website www.eci.gov.in  
Regions defined as in Table 3 
 
Despite the national reach of the NDA and BJP seen in Table 3, Table 4 demonstrates 
that in terms of seat share, the BJP’s success was in the northern states – returning 62 
percent of its seats.  When the other Hindi heartland states of Himachal Pradesh and 
Jharkhand are added to this total, it rises to 67 percent.  This partially reflects the fact 
that 41 percent of India’s seats are returned from the Hindi heartland (despite a freeze 
on redistricting constituencies to counter the political implications of the 
disproportionate population growth of the north of the country) (McMillan 2001).  
Even so, the BJP decimated the opposition in states such as Uttar Pradesh (which 
returns 80 seats to the Lok Sabha) and Bihar (which returns 40 seats).  In Uttar 
Pradesh it secured 71 out of 80 seats and all 25 seats in Rajasthan. In addition to the 
Hindi heartland states, it won all 26 seats in Gujarat. 
 
Taken with the composition of the cabinet, the dangers of a northern Hindi dominated 
government emerging are clear. Only 17 percent of Modi’s original 24 member4 
cabinet are from the southern states (21 percent of the population).  54 percent are 
representatives of Hindi-speaking states (although this number increases to 63 percent 
when the birth place of the individual is used rather than the state they are 
representing). This over-represents an already dominant group - the Hindi speaking 
states comprise 46 percent of the population.  While this is not surprising in that the 
BJP did not secure much support in the southern states, there are dangers of 
concentrating representation around the northern states e.g. Modi has championed the 
cause of Hindi over that of the other official language, English (Kalra and Asokan 
2014).  In Modi’s Teacher’s Day online Q and A session with school children, even 
those children from non-Hindi speaking states who asked questions in English were 
responded to in Hindi (The Hindu 2014).  Although Modi is more comfortable 
conversing in Hindi rather than English, such an attitude benefits the northern Hindi-
speaking states over those, many of which are in the south, which speak different 
languages.  The debates over the official language of India were heated in the 1960s.  
Protests were recently made to Modi over the attempt by the University Grants 
Commission to instruct Universities to teach in both Hindi and English (Zee News 
2014). The directive was withdrawn, but the incident illustrates the concerns of the 
non-Hindi speaking states, reinforced by Modi’s insistence on the use of Hindi within 
the central civil service (Rediff.com 2014a).  
 
The ‘Modi wave’ has also had implications for religious minority representation, as 
the Samajwadi Party (SP) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) traditionally captured 
the Muslim vote. In terms of seat share, neither did well in this election. The BSP 
failed to secure any seats (after securing 21 in 2009) despite securing 19.6 percent of 
the vote in Uttar Pradesh. The SP was reduced from 23 seats to 5. This is important 
because seats reserved specifically for religious minorities such as Muslims were 
abolished after independence (Adeney 2007, Bajpai 2011), and Muslims have been 
disproportionately under-represented since this time The current Lok Sabha is not an 
aberration in this regard, but with 23 Muslim members out of 543, ‘the representation 
of Muslims is the lowest since 1952. For the first time also, the ruling party does not 
have a single Muslim MP in the Lok Sabha’ (Verniers and YIF Electoral Data Unit 
2014).  The Muslim member of the cabinet, not coincidentally the Minister for 
Minority Affairs, is a member of the upper house. The cabinet includes four members 
of religious minorities, 1 Muslim, 2 Sikhs and 1 Zorastrian. None are in senior 
positions.  
 
As noted, the limited number of Muslims who achieve representation in the Lok 
Sabha is longstanding.  Even under Nehru, Muslims did not hold senior positions in 
cabinet (Wilkinson 2000, 779).   The 2006 Sachar Commission Report argued that 
India needed to change the procedure for the delimitation of constituencies to 
‘improve the opportunities for … Muslims, to contest and get elected to the Indian 
Parliament and the State Assemblies’ (2006, 241) (currently, many Muslim majority 
areas are designated as reserved constituencies for Scheduled Castes). In the view of 
the Sachar Commission this ‘certainly reduces the opportunities that Muslims have to 
get elected to democratic institutions’ (2006, 25).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 One member was killed in a car crash in June 2014. 
Although it is too soon to say whether the reduced Muslim representation in 
parliament will result in policies detrimental to the Muslim community, in its first 100 
days the BJP has rolled back from several policies of the UPA, notably in relation to 
the position of Muslims within India (Economic Times 2014).  Prominent Indian 
academic Zoya Hasan articulates the concerns of many when she argues that there is a 
‘template of ‘majoritarianism’ running through Modi’s government (2014). Modi ‘has 
been careful not to speak the language of division and Hindutva’ (Subrahmaniam 
2014) but several appointments he has made have challenged his inclusiveness (such 
as the personnel changes at the Indian Council for Social Science Research).  He has 
also failed to prevent ‘communal polarisation as an instrument of political 
mobilisation’ (Hasan 2014) e.g. the provocative use by the RSS and BJP politicians 
seeking election of the phrase ‘love jihad’ to describe the ‘misbehaviour’ of (Muslim) 
men with (Hindu) women.  Hasan concludes that the ‘hiatus between the rhetoric of 
Modi and the reality on the ground is palpable. The plethora of communal statements 
indicates a concerted attempt to impose a majoritarian concept of nationhood’ (2014). 
There are ominous signs for non-Hindi speaking and non-Hindu minorities.  In 
October 2014, the state broadcaster, Doordashan, televised an hour-long address by 
the leader of the RSS (Rediff.com	   2014b),	   a	   move	   that	   was	   seen	   to	   be	  inflammatory,	   and,	   in	   the	  words	  of	   historian	  Ramachandra	  Guha,	   ‘	   naked	   state	  majoritarianism’	  (2014).	   
 
However, although Modi managed to secure an overall majority for the BJP, Modi is 
still dependent on alliance partners in the upper house.  Although the BJP performed 
extremely well in state elections in Haryana and Maharashtra in October 2014, this 
was partly as a result of opposition disunity (Wyatt 2015).  The result of May 2014 
may not be repeated.  It would be a brave BJP election strategist who would jettison 
the alliance partners for the next general election. This is likely to constrain rampant 
majoritarianism along Hindu nationalist lines, for example the adoption of a Uniform 
Civil Code (which would remove the personal laws of Muslims and Christians).  But 
it is less likely to constrain the rhetoric of the Sangh Parivar (Hindu family) of 
organisations at the state or local level, with detrimental consequences for the 
religious minorities of India.  And the discourse of politics is likely to continue in a 
majoritarian direction, as seen by the recent broadcast on Doordarshan. In India, the 
logic of coalition politics is likely to constrain exclusionary national initiatives, but 
there are concerns about how this will play out at the local and the state level. In 
addition, the well publicised under representation of Muslims within political life is to 
the detriment of that community.  
 
Pakistan 
 
The dangers of one group’s domination of the state have also been expressed in 
Pakistan, with the election of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) 
government in 2013 – another government elected with an overall majority that defied 
predictions.  Pakistan’s democratic journey has been very different to India’s (2004). 
The lack of a genuinely representative national political party and the refusal to accept 
the legitimacy of linguistic claims to recognition (in stark contrast to India) 
contributed to the delaying of national elections and the proclamation of martial law 
in 1958. National elections were not held until 1970, 23 years after independence.  
When elections were finally held, the elite of the western wing, notably Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, refused to recognise their legitimacy as the Awami League of the eastern 
wing had secured an outright majority.  The National Assembly was not convened, 
leading to a bloody war of secession and the ultimate creation of Bangladesh in late 
1971. Pakistan’s experience with democracy after 1971 fared little better – Zulfiqar 
Ali Bhutto’s prime ministership being bought to an end by Chief of Army Staff Zia-
ul-Huq after the elections of 1977.  After Zia’s sudden and unexplained death, the 
period of 1988-1999 saw four governments elected but then dismissed by the 
president on the behest of the military, or in 1999, by an outright coup (Talbot 2009).   
The current democratic transition however, after the elections of 2008 and 2013 has 
more democratic substance – two relatively free and fair elections have been held, 
and there has been a turnover in office between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and 
the PML-N.  Freedom House has changed Pakistan’s democratic status to that of an 
electoral democracy. However, political parties in Pakistan, even more so than in 
India, are personalistic machines, and dynastic politics is rife.  For example, 
‘[a]pproximately 44 per cent of all seats in the outgoing National and provincial 
assemblies were occupied by individuals who had relatives serving in previous 
assemblies’ (Kohari 2013). Despite this, it would be mistaken to conclude that there 
are no differences between the parties.  The ruling PML-N draws more of its support 
from the urban middle class than does the PPP for instance, and there are many 
regionalist parties (although the latter gain little electoral support). There are also 
policy differences between political parties concerning strategies to deal with the 
Pakistan Taliban and on US drone strikes e.g. with Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-
Insaf (PTI) taking a softer position on the former, and a harder position on the latter, 
than the PPP.   
Sharif’s election has revived fears of Punjabi domination. Pakistan has suffered from 
both real and perceived threats of Punjabi domination since independence.  Not only 
do Punjabis dominate the armed forces, the province (with 56 percent of the 
population – as of the controversial 1998 census) returns 54 percent of the general 
seats to the National Assembly. All political parties have to target the Punjab if they 
aspire to national power; this includes the Sindhi based PPP.5  Following the 2013 
election in which the PML-N managed to come to power on its own, Punjabi 
domination was confirmed.  The PML-N is a northern Punjabi dominated party, as 
opposed to the PPP who traditionally garnered nationwide support.  In 2008 the PPP 
achieved a CRI score of 0.10 compared to the PML-N’s of 0.29 (Adeney 2009), one 
of the only truly national parties.  However in 2013, because of the massive reduction 
in votes for the previous ruling party (although less of a decimation than the Congress 
in India) its CRI increased to 0.28, reflecting its failure to secure as much support in 
the provinces of KP and Balochistan as it did in 2008.    
 
In 2013 the PML-N score was 0.27, a similar level to its 2008 figure, reflecting its 
electoral reliance on the Punjab. Although the scores are similar to the PPP, these data 
demonstrate the limitations of the CRI as a measure when such a large percentage of 
the population is concentrated within one unit.  Intuitively, the PPP should receive a 
much more ‘national’ score than the PML-N because its vote share is divided almost 
equally between Punjab and Sindh.  Table 5 therefore also reports the Party 
Nationalisation Score (Jones and Mainwaring 2003). This measure produces a score 
between 0-1 (unlike the CRI, higher numbers mean a more nationalized party and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Interview with Sherry Rehman of the PPP, Islamabad, 2005. 
lower numbers mean a more territorially concentrated party).  Unlike the CRI, this 
measure treats all units equally, irrespective of population. The PPP’s PNS score of 
0.63 compared to the 0.54 of the PML-N better reflects its greater nationalisation than 
the PML-N. 
 
Table 5: The CRI and PNS for the Pakistan 2013 National Election 
 
Party CRI PNS Vote share 
(percentage) 
Punjab Sindh KP Balochistan 
PTI 0.13 0.91 17 66.01 10.87 20.52 1.37 
PML-N 0.27 0.54 33 89.14 3.49 5.68 0.92 
PPP 0.28 0.63 15 41.24 51.78 4.69 0.70 
JI 0.28 0.49 2 36.00 20.66 38.01 1.10 
JUI-F 0.68 0.53 3 7.73 9.49 63.88 0.02 
MQM 0.73 0.3 5 1.63 97.78 0.21 0.01 
ANP 0.79 0.3 0.9 0.45 4.97 89.69 0.02 
 
Imran Khan’s PTI, was the most ‘national’ of all the parties, with a CRI score of 0.13, 
or PNS score of 0.91, reflecting the fact that levels of support may not always 
translate into seats, particularly in simple plurality electoral systems such as Pakistan.  
 
Table 6: The distribution of party seats between provinces 
 
 
Notes: these data have been calculated from the original seats gained by the parties, before 
Independents joined these parties after the elections e.g. 12 independents joined the PML-N from 
Punjab, bringing the overall tally for the PML-N to 131 general seats plus 32 top up seats for women.  
For the purposes of understanding regional concentration of the votes, it is more appropriate to use the 
original seat distribution.  
 
Table 6 demonstrates that the PML-N gained over 90 percent of its seats from a single 
province, the Punjab (and it gained over 80 percent of the seats of that state).  In 
comparison, Khan’s PTI, was more evenly distributed (albeit with lower seat share), 
with 63 percent from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 26 percent from the Punjab.  The 
PPP was confined almost entirely to its Sindhi base, with 92 percent of the seats 
coming from that province.  Regional parties such as the ANP and the MQM were 
also confined to particular provinces, as was the Islamic JI. The JUI-F split its seats 
between both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.   
 
 Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan ICT FATA General Seats 
PML-N 119 92.2% 1 0.8% 5 3.9% 1 0.8% 1 0.8% 2 1.6% 129 100% 
PTI 7 25.9% 1 3.7% 17 63% 0 0% 1 3.7% 1 3.7% 27 100% 
PPP 3 8.1% 34 91.9% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 37 100% 
MQM 0 0% 19 100% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 19 100% 
JUI-F 0 0% 0 0% 4 44.4% 4 44.4% 0 0% 1 11.1% 9 100% 
JI 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 0 0.0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 
ANP 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 0 0.0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 
Others 19 44.2% 6 14% 4 9.3% 5 11.6% 0 0% 9 20.9% 43 100% 
Given that a major tension in Pakistan concerns the domination of the Punjab, it is 
significant that of the 31 members of Sharif’s 2013 cabinet, 70 percent were either 
elected from Punjab or are listed on the Senate website as being from Punjab, well in 
excess of the 54 percent of the population from that province.  In addition, as Javid 
also notes, many of the positions non-Punjabis hold are ‘of lesser importance and 
significance’ (2014).  The 18th Amendment to the Pakistani constitution in 2010 and 
the Finance Commission Award went some way to redressing some of the historical 
imbalances in the federation (e.g. amending the formula for the horizontal distribution 
of resources between provinces, renaming the province of NWFP to Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa – a longstanding demand of Pakhtuns - and giving greater provincial 
control over revenues from natural resources to Balochistan) (see Adeney 2012 for 
more details). However, the fact that Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi, accused of 
perpetuating Punjabi dominance (Ranjan 2013), has overrepresented Punjabis in his 
cabinet, reinforces one of the major fault lines in Pakistani politics – that of 
perceptions of the ‘evil Punjabi empire’.6   
 
In both India and Pakistan therefore, there are both perceived and actual concerns 
about majoritarianism. These pale into insignificance when considering Sri Lanka.  
 
Sri Lanka 
 
Sri Lanka has ostensibly been a democracy since independence in 1948, with no 
break in elections.  However, the two main parties have played a very uneven role in 
democratic development.  Both the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lankan 
Freedom Party (SLFP) have cleaved to the Sinhalese ethnic majority.  The parties 
were also dominated by a small clique of prominent families.  The parties did much to 
polarise the ethnic divide between the majority Sinhalese community and the minority 
Tamils.  Adopting a majoritarian democracy after independence (Adeney and Wyatt 
2004), Tamils were gradually frozen out of positions of power, and demands for 
devolution and recognition of language rights were refused as the majority Sinhalese 
engaged in ‘ethnic outbidding’ (Devotta 2002), partly under pressure from Buddhist 
monks. In 1983 a secessionist conflict broke out after decades of refusal to concede 
demands for recognition and autonomy.  This was finally crushed in 2009 with the 
elimination of the LTTE leadership. Yet since the victory of the government, rather 
than promoting national reconciliation, Sri Lanka has been described as 
‘authoritarian’ by the UN Human Rights Commissioner in 2013 (Francis 2013).  
 
President Rajapaksa was re-elected to the presidency in January 2010, and his 
opponent, former army chief Fonseka, jailed for corruption for two years in 
September 2010.   Sri Lankan politics continues to be dominated by a few families, 
but the current domination of the political hierarchy by members of Rajapaksa’s 
family has exceeded that of other regimes, with four members of his immediate 
family represented in the government (Blair 2013, Devotta 2011).   A clamp down on 
press freedom (particularly in the Tamil region but also the Sinhala heartland) had led 
to ‘39 media workers [being]… killed or abducted and made to disappear while many 
media institutions have been bombed and burned, forcing many in the profession to 
flee the country. Not a single perpetrator has been brought to justice’ (Reporters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Mehmood Achakzai, leader of the PKMAP, a Pashtun regionalist party based in Balochistan – 
interview with author, Islamabad, May 2005. 
without Borders 2013).  Sri Lanka has been classified as 165th out of 180 countries on 
the 2014 press freedom index, a position that is getting steadily worse. 
  
After the success in quelling the insurgency of the LTTE, in 2010 Rajapaksa’s SLFP 
has dominated party politics.  The United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 
coalition led by the SLFP won 60 percent of the vote, compared to 29 percent for the 
UNP.  It won an overwhelming majority without external Tamil support, ‘almost 
exclusively in the Sinhalese-majority electoral districts’ (Uyangoda 2011, 133). In 
addition, the radical Sinhala nationalist JVP was weakened, reduced from 40 to seven 
seats in the 2010 parliament, its mantel of Sinhala nationalism successfully 
appropriated by the SLFP (Uyangoda 2011, 134).  UPFA does include a Tamil party – 
the EDPD - but this is the party of a pro-government militia that fought against the 
LTTE.  Tamil marginalisation is evident; despite the fact that Tamils comprise 18 
percent of the population, only one Tamil was included in the 67 member cabinet, and 
that was the leader of the EPDP.7 He holds the position of ‘Traditional Industries & 
Small Enterprise Development’; hardly a major portfolio.   The antipathy of the Tamil 
community to Rajapaksa is evident by the fact that they voted overwhelmingly for his 
opponent in the 2010 presidential election, despite the fact that Fonseka had ‘headed 
the Sri Lankan Army during the war against the LTTE’ (Uyangoda 2011, 132). 
Despite the previous decades of conflict in the country, President Rajapaksa has made 
few efforts to introduce further provincial autonomy as a means of meeting the 
aspirations of the Tamils. Dissatisfaction with his policies is demonstrated by the 78 
percent vote share the Tamil National Alliance achieved in provincial elections in the 
north in 2013. Subsequently ‘the government has refused to allow the NPC [Northern 
Provincial Council] to establish an effective administration’ (International Crisis 
Group 2014).  A lack of representation at the national and the provincial level is a 
marked demonstration of the exclusion of Tamils from the political process in the 
country.  This raises real concerns about the state of democracy in Sri Lanka, 
although it must also be noted that the rise of authoritarian majoritarianism in the 
country has also resulted in the targeting of Muslims and political opposition within 
the Sinhala community. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The states of South Asia are diverse and many of the countries in the region have 
adopted political, employment and educational affirmative action policies for 
particular groups. South Asia has also witnessed the reorganisation of state structures 
to accommodate some diversity, such as linguistic reorganisation in India. However, 
much of this accommodation of groups has been achieved through informal 
mechanisms, such as representation in a large national political party or governing 
coalition (such as the PPP-led coalition from 2008 in Pakistan). It is notable that in 
those countries of South Asia, such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan, which have not 
accommodated their non-dominant groups, have witnessed high levels of conflict.  
Pakistan has taken important steps in recent years to accepting the multinational 
nature of the state, but the domination of Punjabis under Nawaz Sharif has reinforced 
concerns about majoritarianism in that country. The authoritarianism in Sri Lanka has 
sought to consolidate itself around Sinhala nationalism, a majoritarian ideology that 
undermines Tamil identification with the state and its institutions. In contrast, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although there are a handful of deputy cabinet Tamil ministers. 
recognition of diversity within the constitution making process in Nepal, while 
currently stalled over the design of the federal arrangements in the country (whether it 
should be an ethnic federation or an administrative one), is designed to facilitate an 
inclusive democracy (Malagodi 2013). Nepal has been following the successful 
Indian experience of accommodation. However, it is precisely this process of 
accommodation that many in India now worry will be undermined by Hindu 
majoritarianism.   
 Article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  3rd	  December	  2014.	  	  Addendum:	  	  In	  January	  2015,	  President	  Rajapaksa	  was	  unexpectedly	  defeated	  in	  the	  presidential	  election	  by	  his	  former	  Minister	  of	  Health,	  Sirisena.	  	  Tamils	  and	  Muslims	  voted	  overwhelmingly	  against	  Rajapaksa,	  as	  did	  those	  Sinhalese	  who	  rejected	  his	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  rule.	  	  Since	  his	  election	  President	  Sirisena	  has	  moved	  to	  reassure	  Tamils,	  appointing	  Kanagasabapathy	  Sripavan,	  a	  Tamil,	  as	  Chief	  Justice.	  	  	  However,	  we	  should	  be	  wary	  of	  predicting	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  long-­‐term	  move	  to	  more	  substantive	  Tamil	  accommodation.	  	  Sri	  Lankan	  history	  is	  replete	  with	  Tamils	  voting	  for	  a	  Sinhalese	  leader	  or	  a	  party	  who	  is	  then	  subject	  to	  ‘ethnic	  outbidding’	  by	  another	  Sinhalese	  political	  party.	  	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  Rajapaksa	  (who	  received	  47.5%	  of	  the	  vote)	  could	  make	  a	  comeback	  in	  the	  parliamentary	  elections	  due	  mid	  2015,	  especially	  given	  the	  fragile	  nature	  of	  the	  governing	  coalition.	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